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Abstract. The decorrelation theory provides a different point of view
on the security of block cipher primitives. Results on some statistical at-
tacks obtained in this context can support or provide new insight on the
security of symmetric cryptographic primitives. In this paper, we study,
for the first time, the multidimensional linear attacks as well as the trun-
cated differential attacks in this context. We show that the cipher should
be decorrelated of order two to be resistant against some multidimen-
sional linear and truncated differential attacks. Previous results obtained
with this theory for linear, differential, differential-linear and boomerang
attacks are also resumed and improved in this paper.
Keywords: decorrelation theory, multidimensional linear cryptanalysis,
truncated differential cryptanalysis.
1 Introduction
In the last 25 years many statistical attacks have been proposed and implemented
on different symmetric key cryptographic primitives. Nowadays, new symmetric
primitives are not considered secure until evaluation by the community. But it
is often difficult to evaluate the security of a cipher due to the large number of
known attacks.
In 1998, Vaudenay [18,21] introduced the decorrelation theory to prevent
this long and tedious security evaluation. When a cipher is designed and proved
secure up to a certain degree of decorrelation, it is secure against a wide range
of statistical attacks. Among statistical attacks, differential cryptanalysis [8],
linear cryptanalysis [17] and their generalizations have been prominent. For
instance, we know that a cipher decorrelated of order two is resistant to the
classical differential and linear cryptanalysis. Recently [7], it has been shown
that the primitives should be decorrelated of order four to be protected against
differential-linear [13,3] and boomerang [22] attacks.
Understanding the similitude of the different statistical attacks is of great
importance to simplify the security analysis of the symmetric cryptographic
primitives. While different works in that direction have been presented in the
last couple of years [16,4,9,10], part of this unification can also be obtained
by determining the order of decorrelation of the new presented attacks. How-
ever, the question of measuring the advantage of taking the information from
different differentials or linear approximations has not yet been studied in the
context of decorrelation theory. In this paper, we study the decorrelation order
of the multidimensional linear and truncated differential attacks. In particular,
we show that a cipher is protected against multidimensional linear attacks if it
is decorrelated of order two. Some elements of the proof are related to the link
between multidimensional linear attacks and truncated differential attacks which
was discovered by Blondeau and Nyberg [9,10]. Using the result obtained for a
special truncated differential distinguisher, we have been able to determine that
the truncated differential attacks involving a large number of input differences
are also decorrelated of order two. Using the decorrelation theory, in this paper,
we provide for the first time an intuition on the power of truncated differen-
tial and multidimensional linear attacks as a function of the number of involved
differential or linear approximations used in the attack.
Outline. In Sect. 2, we recall some basic definitions and previous works in the
context of the decorrelation theory. In Sect. 3 we study the multidimensional
linear attack in this context. In Sect. 4, we study the decorrelation order of
the truncated differential attack. In Sect. 5, we provide some improvement of
the previous results for the well known differential, linear, differential-linear and
boomerang attacks. Sect. 6 concludes this paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Statistical Attacks
We recall in this section some basic definitions related to the statistical attacks
studied in this paper.
Linear cryptanalysis [17] uses a linear relation between bits from plaintexts,
corresponding ciphertexts, and the encryption key. Given a permutation Enc
over {0, 1}`, the strength of the linear relation is measured by its correlation.
The correlation of a function Enc : F`2 → F`2 at point (α, β) ∈ F`2 × F`2 is defined
as
cor(α, β) = 2−`
[
#
{
x ∈ F`2|α · x⊕ β · Enc(x) = 0
}−
#
{
x ∈ F`2|α · x⊕ β · Enc(x) = 1
} ]
,
where the quantity within brackets can be computed as the Walsh transform of
α · x⊕ β · Enc(x) evaluated at zero.
Through this paper, the square correlation at point v = (α, β) ∈ F2`2 will be
denoted by LPEnc(v) and corresponds to LPEnc(v) = cor2(α, β).
For the generalizations of linear cryptanalysis, such as multidimensional lin-
ear cryptanalysis [14], a quantity C, called capacity, is used for evaluating the
non-uniformity of the set of linear approximations.
The capacity corresponds to the sum of the square correlations of the involved
linear approximations. We let V ⊂ F2`2 be the vector space spanned by different
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(αj , βj) masks. In the context of multidimensional linear attacks, we define the
capacity
capEnc(V ) =
∑
v∈V,v 6=0
LPEnc(v).
In the following of this paper, we denote by k the dimension of V .
In differential cryptanalysis [8], the attacker is interested in finding and ex-
ploiting non-uniformity in occurrences of plaintext and ciphertext differences.
Given the differences ∆ ∈ F`2 and Γ ∈ F`2, the probability DPEnc(∆,Γ ) of the
differential (∆,Γ ) is defined as
DPEnc(∆,Γ ) = 2−`#{x ∈ F`2 |Enc(x)⊕ Enc(x⊕∆) = Γ}.
The power of the generalization of differential cryptanalysis involving multiple
differentials is measured by a sum or average of these probabilities. For the
truncated differential attacks [15] with differences (∆,Γ ) in the vector space
V ⊥ ⊂ F2`2 we define
P STDEnc (V
⊥) = 2−2`#{(x, x′) ∈ F`2 × F`2 | (x⊕ x′,Enc(x)⊕ Enc(x′)) ∈ V ⊥}.
We can show that,
P STDEnc (V
⊥) = 2−`
∑
(∆,Γ )∈V ⊥
DPEnc(∆,Γ ).
Derived from the general link between differential probability and linear cor-
relations [12], the authors of [10,11] show a general link between multidimen-
sional linear attacks and truncated differential attacks. To derive in Sect. 3 the
decorrelation order of a multidimensional linear attack, we will use this link.
Using our notations, Th. 1 of [11] corresponds to the following one.
Theorem 1. Let V ⊥ be the set of all u such that u · v = 0 for all v ∈ V . Using
the previous notation, we obtain the following relation between P STDEnc (V
⊥) and
capEnc(V ):
2−kcapEnc(V ) = p
STD
Enc (V
⊥)− 2−k.
Proof. We provide the proof with our settings. We have
1 + capEnc(V ) =
∑
v∈V
LPEnc(v)
=
∑
v∈V
2−`
∑
u
(−1)u·vDPEnc(u)
= 2−`
∑
u
DPEnc(u)
∑
v∈V
(−1)u·v.
3
Since v 7→ u · v is a group homomorphism from V to Z2, either it is balanced,
or identically equal to 0 (when u ∈ V ⊥, by definition). We have
1 + capEnc(V ) = 2
k−` ∑
u∈V ⊥
DPEnc(u).
So, pSTDEnc (V
⊥) = 2−k + 2−kcapEnc(V ). uunionsq
Splitting the space V ⊥ of involved differentials to the spaces V ⊥in and V
⊥
out of input
and output differences, we can define the truncated differential probability PTDEnc
as follows
PTDEnc(V
⊥) = 2−`
1
|V ⊥in |
∑
∆∈V ⊥in
#{x ∈ F`2 |Enc(x)⊕ Enc(x⊕∆) ∈ V ⊥out}.
Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis. Differential and linear attacks were used to-
gether for the first time by Langford and Hellman [13]. This was differential-
linear cryptanalysis. The basic idea is to split the cipher under consideration
into a composition of two parts. The split should be such that, for the first part
of the cipher there should exist a strong truncated differential with input dif-
ference ∆ and for the second part there should exist a strongly biased linear
approximation with output mask β. In [13], the particular case where the differ-
ential over the first part holds with probability one has been introduced. Later
on, Biham et al. [3] generalized this attack using a probabilistic truncated differ-
ential on the first rounds of the distinguisher. In [11], Blondeau et al presented
a general model for this attack.
pDLEnc(∆,β) = 2
−`# {x | β · (Enc(x)⊕ Enc(x⊕∆)) = 0} .
Boomerang Attack. In the boomerang attack, introduced in 1999 by Wagner [22],
the advantage is taken from both the encryption and decryption. Given a differ-
ence ∆ between two plaintexts x and x′, the attacker is taking advantage of the
probability
pBooEnc (∆,∇) = 2−`#
{
x | Enc−1 (Enc(x)⊕∇)⊕ Enc−1 (Enc(x⊕∆)⊕∇) = ∆} ,
where ∇ is a ciphertext difference.
2.2 The Decorrelation Theory
We consider a permutation Enc over {0, 1}`. Sometimes, Enc will be a random
permutation with uniform distribution and will be denoted by C∗. Sometimes,
it will be a permutation defined by a random key K and will be denoted by CK .
Decorrelation was first presented in [18]. The non-adaptive (resp. adaptive)
decorrelation of CK of order d is denoted by ‖[CK ]d − [C∗]d‖∞ (resp. ‖[CK ]d −
[C∗]d‖a). It is the ‖ · ‖∞- (resp. ‖ · ‖a-) distance between the matrices [CK ]d and
[C∗]d. Given a random Enc, we define [Enc]d, the d-wise distribution matrix by
[Enc]d(x1,...,xd),(y1,...,yd) = Pr[y1 = Enc(x1), . . . , yd = Enc(xd)].
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The ‖ · ‖∞-norm is defined by
‖M‖∞ = max
x1,...,xd
∑
y1,...,yd
|M(x1,...,xd),(y1,...,yd)|.
A random variable can be considered as a random function from a set of cardinal-
ity 1, so its d-wise distribution matrix is a row vector and the ‖·‖∞ matrix-norm
corresponds to the ‖ ·‖1 vector-norm. For distributions, the ‖ ·‖1-distance is also
called the statistical distance. The ‖ · ‖a-norm was defined in [20] by
‖M‖a = max
x1
∑
y1
· · ·max
xd
∑
yd
|M(x1,...,xd),(y1,...,yd)|.
Here is the fundamental link between the best advantage of a distinguisher and
decorrelation.
Theorem 2 (Best advantage and decorrelation, Th. 10–11 of [21]). The
‖ · ‖∞-decorrelation of order d of CK , ‖[CK ]d − [C∗]d‖∞, is twice the best ad-
vantage of a non-adaptive unbounded distinguisher between CK and C
∗ which is
allowed to make d encryption queries.
The ‖ · ‖a-decorrelation of order d of CK , ‖[CK ]d− [C∗]d‖a, is twice the best
advantage of an adaptive unbounded distinguisher between CK and C
∗ which is
allowed to make d encryption queries.
We say CK is decorrelated if its decorrelation is small. We have perfect decorre-
lation when the decorrelation is 0. I.e., [CK ]
d = [C∗]d, meaning
Pr[y1 = CK(x1), . . . , yd = CK(xd)] = Pr[y1 = C
∗(x1), . . . , yd = C∗(xd)]
for all x1, . . . , xd, y1, . . . , yd.
For instance, decorrelation of order d = 2 corresponds to that Pr[y1 =
CK(x1), y2 = CK(x2)] is always close to
1
2`(2`−1) for x1 6= x2 and y1 6= y2.
This is the notion of pairwise independence by Wegman and Carter [23].
Given a permutation Enc over {0, 1}`, we define QEnc, a function from {0, 1}×
{0, 1}` to {0, 1}` by
QEnc(0, x) = Enc(x) and QEnc(1, y) = Enc
−1(y).
To study distinguishers which can make encryption and decryption queries, we
just consider the decorrelation of QEnc instead of the decorrelation of Enc. For
this, we study the distance between [QCK ]
d and [QC∗ ]
d.
We review some general security results below.
Non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d. Given an encryption function Enc,
a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d (Distinguisher Iter) is character-
ized by a distribution D and two Boolean functions T and f . With n iterations,
it works as follows:
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Distinguisher Iter:
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: pick (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ ({0, 1}`)d following distribution D
3: set yj = Enc(xj) for j = 1, . . . , d
4: set bi = T (x1, . . . , xd, y1, . . . , yd)
5: end for
6: output f(b1, . . . , bn)
For such distinguisher, the following results have been derived in [19].
Theorem 3 (Advantage of Iter bounded by decorrelation [19], Th. 18
of [21]). For the Boolean function T , we have
E(pIterCK )− E(pIterC∗ ) ≤5 3
√
n2
(
2δ +
5d2
2× 2` +
3
2
‖[CK ]2d − [C∗]2d‖∞
)
+ n‖[CK ]2d − [C∗]2d‖∞
where δ is an upper bound on the probability that the distinguisher picks a
plaintext in common between any two iterations. I.e., δ = Pr[∃i, j xi = x′j :
(x1, . . . , xd)← D, (x′1, . . . , x′d)← D].
Note that it was proven in [6,7] that we cannot have a general security result
when δ is high or when we only have a decorrelation of order 2d− 1.
Th. 3 was generalized in [19] to the case where the range of T has s elements
instead of 2:
Theorem 4 (Advantage of Iter bounded by decorrelation, Th. 7 of [19]).
If T maps onto a set of s elements, we have
E(pIterCK )− E(pIterC∗ ) ≤3s 3
√
n2
(
2δ +
2d2
2`
+
d3
2`(2` − d) +
3
2
‖[CK ]2d − [C∗]2d‖∞
)
+
ns
2
‖[CK ]2d − [C∗]2d‖∞
where δ is an upper bound on the probability that the distinguisher picks a
plaintext in common between any two iterations. I.e., δ = Pr[∃i, j xi = x′j :
(x1, . . . , xd)← D, (x′1, . . . , x′d)← D].
Adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d. Th. 3 was generalized in [5,7] to adap-
tive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguishers (i.e., distinguishers which make
in each iteration some adaptive queries and can also make chosen ciphertext
queries): Given an encryption function Enc, an adaptive plaintext-ciphertext it-
erated distinguisher of order d (Distinguisher AIter) is characterized by d − 1
functions q1, . . . , qd−1, and two Boolean functions T and f . With n iterations, it
works as follows:
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Distinguisher AIter:
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: pick a uniformly distributed sequence ρ of random coins
3: for j = 1 to d do
4: set zj = qj(QEnc(z1), . . . , QEnc(zj−1); ρ)
5: end for
6: set bi = T (QEnc(z1), . . . , QEnc(zd); ρ)
7: end for
8: output f(b1, . . . , bn)
Theorem 5 (Advantage of AIter bounded by decorrelation [5], Th. 5
of [7]). We have
E(pAIterCK )− E(pAIterC∗ ) ≤5 3
√
n2
(
2δ + e8d22−` +
2d2
2`
+
3
2
‖[QCK ]2d − [QC∗ ]2d‖∞
)
+ n‖[QCK ]2d − [QC∗ ]2d‖∞
where δ is an upper bound on the probability that the distinguisher picks a query
in common between any two iterations.
In what follows we give tighter results for specific classes of iterated attacks
for which we can get rid of δ and sometimes rely on a lower decorrelation order.
2.3 Previous Results in the Context of Decorrelation Theory
To obtain the decorrelation order as well as the order of the different statisti-
cal attacks we have to describe the distinguishers we are working with. In this
section, we describe the differential, linear, differential-linear and boomerang
attacks, and recall the different results obtained for these distinguishers. A com-
parison with the results obtained for the multidimensional linear and truncated
differential attacks will be presented later in this paper.
Differential Cryptanalysis. Given an encryption function Enc, a differential dis-
tinguisher (Distinguisher DC) is characterized by two differences ∆ and Γ and
a Boolean function f . With n iterations, it works as follows:
Distinguisher DC:
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: pick x ∈ {0, 1}` uniformly
3: set x′ = x⊕∆
4: set y = Enc(x) and y′ = Enc(x′)
5: set bi = 1y⊕y′=Γ
6: end for
7: output f(b1, . . . , bn)
This is a non-adaptive iterated attack of order 2.
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Theorem 6 (Advantage of DC bounded by decorrelation, Th. 13 of [21]).
For the function f(b1, . . . , bn) = maxi bi, we have
E(pDCCK )− E(pDCC∗) ≤
n
2` − 1 +
n
2
‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞.
Linear Cryptanalysis. Given an encryption function Enc, a linear distinguisher
(Distinguisher LC) is characterized by two masks α and β, and a Boolean func-
tion f . With n iterations, it works as follows:
Distinguisher LC:
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: pick x ∈ {0, 1}` uniformly
3: set y = Enc(x)
4: set bi = α · x⊕ β · y
5: end for
6: output f(b1, . . . , bn)
This is a non-adaptive iterated attack of order 1.
Theorem 7 (Advantage of LC bounded by decorrelation, Th. 17 of [21]).
We have
E(pLCCK )− E(pLCC∗) ≤ 3 3
√
n‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞ + n
2` − 1 + 3
3
√
n
2` − 1 .
Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis. Given a function Enc, a differential-linear dis-
tinguisher is characterized by a difference ∆, a mask β, and a Boolean function
f . With n iterations, it works as follows:
Distinguisher DL:
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: pick x1 ∈ {0, 1}` uniformly
3: set x2 = x1 ⊕∆
4: set y1 = Enc(x1) and y2 = Enc(x2)
5: set bi = β · (y1 ⊕ y2)
6: end for
7: output f(b1, . . . , bn)
This is a non-adaptive iterated attack of order 2.
Theorem 8 (Advantage of DL bounded by decorrelation, Th. 7 of [7]).
We have
E(pDLCK )− E(pDLC∗) ≤3 3
√
n‖[CK ]4 − [C∗]4‖∞ + n 2× 2
` − 5
(2` − 1)(2` − 3)+
3 3
√
n
2× 2` − 5
(2` − 1)(2` − 3) .
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This results say that if a cipher is decorrelation to the order 4, it is protected
against differential- linear cryptanalysis. It was further proven in [1, pp. 77–78]
that some ciphers decorrelated to the order 3 can have a high advantage with
DL. Which means that the decorrelation of order 4 is really what is needed.
Remark 9. The result from [7] was stated for a function f based on a counter
b1 + · · ·+ bn but it is easy to see that the proof holds for a more general f as it
is very similar to that of Th. 7.
Boomerang Cryptanalysis. Given an encryption function Enc, a boomerang dis-
tinguisher is characterized by two differences ∆ and ∇ and a Boolean function
f . With n iterations, it works as follows:
Distinguisher Boo:
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: pick x1 ∈ {0, 1}` uniformly
3: set x2 = x1 ⊕∆
4: set y1 = Enc(x1) and y2 = Enc(x2)
5: set y3 = y1 ⊕∇ and y4 = y2 ⊕∇
6: set x3 = Enc
−1(y3) and x4 = Enc−1(y4)
7: set bi = 1x3⊕x4=∆
8: end for
9: output f(b1, . . . , bn)
This is an adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated attack of order 4.
Theorem 10 (Advantage of Boo bounded by decorrelation, Th. 8 of [7]).
For the function f(b1, . . . , bn) = maxi bi, we have
E(pBooCK )− E(pBooC∗ ) ≤ n
2× 2` − 5
(2` − 1)(2` − 3) +
n
2
‖[CK ]4 − [C∗]4‖a.
It was further proven in [1, pp. 79–80] that some ciphers decorrelated to the
order 3 can have a high advantage with Boo. We deduce that decorrelation of
order 4 is really what is needed.
A summary of the results presented in this section (and new ones) is given
in Table 1.
3 Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis
In this section we study the multidimensional linear (ML) attack. To do so we
consider the following multidimensional linear distinguisher (Distinguisher ML):
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Distinguisher ML:
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: pick a random x ∈ {0, 1}`
3: set y = Enc(x)
4: for j = 1 to k do
5: set bi,j = (αj · x)⊕ (βj · y)
6: end for
7: set bi = (bi,1, . . . , bi,k)
8: end for
9: output f(b1, . . . , bn)
I.e., we look at the observed distribution of the bits (b1,1, . . . , bn,k) and we take
a decision by following a function f . According to this algorithm, this attack
looks like a non-adaptive iterated attack of order 1, except that a vector bi is
kept instead of a bit at each iteration. We want to bound the advantage of
this distinguisher for any function f . We let pMLEnc be the probability (over the
selection of the random x’s) to output 1 by using the fixed function Enc. We
want to bound
E(pMLCK )− E(pMLC∗)
where K is a random key, CK is the encryption under the key K, and E(p
ML
CK
)
is the expected value over the distribution of K, and where C∗ is a uniformly
distributed random permutation and E(pMLC∗) is the expected value over the dis-
tribution of C∗.
For Enc fixed, all vectors bi are independent and identically distributed. We
let DEnc be the distribution of the vector bi.
We let V be the vector space spanned by the (αj , βj) masks. We recall that
k denotes the dimension of V .
We could apply Th. 4 with d = 1, s = 2k, δ = 2−`, and obtain
E(pMLCK )− E(pMLC∗) ≤3× 2k 3
√
n2
(
4
2`
+
1
2`(2` − 1) +
3
2
‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞
)
+
n2k
2
‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞.
With a negligible decorrelation, we would obtain a security for a data complexity
n up to approximately 2
`
2−3k. Nevertheless, this is meaningless when the dimen-
sion k of V is such that k > `6 . With the technique to develop in this section,
we aim at n ≈ 2 `−k2 . This makes sense until k is close to `.
We note that if k > `, there exists a Boolean function bit(y) on the ciphertext
and a mapping from bi = (bi,1, . . . , bi,k) to (x, bit(y)). For n relatively small,
the vectors (b1, . . . , bn) uniquely identify the key K. So, there exists a function
f (maybe with high complexity) leading to a very high advantage. Hence, we
cannot prove any security without assuming any complexity on f .
For k = `− cste, we could have cases in which there is a mapping from bi to
(x1, . . . , xk−1, bit(y)) so 2cste+1 possible values for x. We can eliminate keys for
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which none of these x lead to bit(y). This eliminates a fraction 2−2
cste+1
of the
keys. So, for n within the order of magnitude of 22
cste+1
, we uniquely determine
the key. So, no information-theoretic security is feasible for these values of n.
Remark 11 (Relation with [14] and [10,11]). In [14], the function f used to eval-
uate the multidimensional linear approximation is based on LLR or χ2 statistical
test. In [10,11], where the relation between the truncated differential and mul-
tidimensional linear key-recovery attacks is derived, the function f is based on
the χ2 test.
To provide a bound on pMLEnc − pMLEnc∗ we consider the following distinguisher,
which is a special truncated differential (STD) distinguisher:
Distinguisher STD:
1: pick two plaintexts x and x′ at random
2: set y = Enc(x) and y′ = Enc(x′)
3: output 1(x′−x,Enc(x′)−Enc(x))∈V ⊥
This distinguisher is a known plaintext truncated differential distinguisher using
only one pair of samples. It corresponds to a non-adaptive attack using two
queries.
Let pSTDEnc be the probability that the output is 1 with Enc fixed. Clearly, as
given in Sect. 2.1, we have
pSTDEnc =
∑
(∆,Γ )∈V ⊥
2−`DPEnc(∆,Γ ).
Lemma 12 (Euclidean distance vs. capacity). We let U be the uniform
distribution. We have
‖DEnc − U‖22 = 2−kcapEnc(V ).
Proof. If v ∈ V , we can write v = ∑j λj(αj , βj). Then,
LPEnc(v) =
(
E
(
(−1)v·(x,Enc(x))
))2
=
(
E
(
(−1)
∑
j λj(αj ,βj)·(x,Enc(x))
))2
=
(
E
(
(−1)
∑
j λjbj
))2
= E
(
(−1)
∑
j λj(bj+b
′
j)
)
so, ∑
v∈V
LPEnc(v) = 2k Pr[b1 = b
′
1, . . . , bk = b
′
k] = 2
k
∑
b1,...,bk
Pr[b1, . . . , bk]
2
11
from which we deduce ∑
v∈V,v 6=0
LPEnc(v) = 2k‖DEnc − U‖22.
uunionsq
Lemma 13 (Statistical distance of iterated distribution). Let n be an
integer and Dβ be a probability distribution for β ∈ {0, 1}. Let D⊗nβ be the
distributions of vectors of n independent samples following Dβ. We have
‖D⊗n0 −D⊗n1 ‖1 ≤ n‖D0 −D1‖1.
Proof. We use
aa′ − bb′ = (a− b)a
′ + b′
2
+ (a′ − b′)a+ b
2
.
We have
‖D⊗n0 −D⊗n1 ‖1 =
1
2
∑
u,v
|D0(u)D⊗(n−1)0 (v)−D1(u)D⊗(n−1)1 (v)|
≤ 1
2
∑
u
|D0(u)−D1(u)|
∑
v
D
⊗(n−1)
0 (v) +D
⊗(n−1)
1 (v)
2
+
1
2
∑
v
|D⊗(n−1)0 (v)−D⊗(n−1)1 (v)|
∑
u
D0(u) +D1(u)
2
= ‖D0 −D1‖1 + ‖D⊗(n−1)0 −D⊗(n−1)1 ‖1.
We conclude by proving the result by induction. uunionsq
Lemma 14 (Advantage of ML vs. Euclidean distance). For any fixed Enc
and Enc∗, we have
pMLEnc − pMLEnc∗ ≤
n2
k
2
2
‖DEnc −DEnc∗‖2.
Proof. Thanks to Th. 2, we have pMLEnc − pMLEnc∗ ≤ 12‖D⊗nEnc − D⊗nEnc∗‖1. Then, we
have ‖D⊗nEnc − D⊗nEnc∗‖1 ≤ n‖DEnc − DEnc∗‖1 due to Lemma 13. Next, we use
‖DEnc −DEnc∗‖1 ≤ 2 k2 ‖DEnc −DEnc∗‖2 due to the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality.
uunionsq
Remark 15. For k = 1 (linear cryptanalysis), we have capEnc(V ) = LP
Enc(α1, β1).
From Lemma 12 and Lemma 14, we obtain
|pMLEnc − pMLEnc∗ | ≤
n
2
√
LPEnc(α1, β1) +
n
2
√
LPEnc
∗
(α1, β1)
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for any fixed Enc and Enc∗. From [21, Lemma 15], we know that there is a
constant p0 such that for any fixed Enc, we have |pMLEnc−p0| ≤ 2
√
nLPEnc(α1, β1).
So,
|pMLEnc − pMLEnc∗ | ≤ 2
√
nLPEnc(α1, β1) + 2
√
nLPEnc
∗
(α1, β1).
As we can see, the bound obtained from Lemma 14 is not tight in the case where
k = 1. We are loosing a factor
√
n. The loss comes from Lemma 13 which is far
from being tight.
Lemma 16 (Link between ML and STD). For any fixed Enc and Enc∗, we
have
pMLEnc − pMLEnc∗ ≤
n2
k
2
2
√
pSTDEnc − 2−k +
n2
k
2
2
√
pSTDEnc∗ − 2−k.
Proof. We apply Th. 1, Lemma 12, Lemma 14, and the triangular inequality
‖DEnc −DEnc∗‖2 ≤ ‖DEnc − U‖2 + ‖DEnc∗ − U‖2. uunionsq
Lemma 17 (Using decorrelation in STD). We have
E(pSTDCK ) ≤ E(pSTDC∗ ) +
1
2
‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞.
Proof. E(pSTDCK ) − E(pSTDC∗ ) expresses as the advantage of STD, a non-adaptive
distinguisher limited to two queries. We conclude by using Th. 2. uunionsq
Lemma 18 (The ideal case in STD). We have
E(pSTDC∗ − 2−k) ≤ 2−`
1− 2−k
1− 2−` .
Assuming that all αj are linearly independent and that all βj are linearly inde-
pendent, we further have
E(pSTDC∗ − 2−k) = 2−`
1− 2−k
1− 2−` .
Proof. From Th. 1, we have
pSTDEnc = 2
−k + 2−k
∑
v∈V,v 6=0
LPEnc(v).
There are exactly 2k − 1 vectors v which are non-zero. When all αj resp. all
βj are linearly independent, neither the left half nor the right half of v is zero.
Based on [21, Lemma 14], we deduce E(LPC
∗
(v)) = 1
2`−1 and obtain
E(pSTDC∗ ) = 2
−k + 2−k
2k − 1
2` − 1 .
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Without the assumption of independence, there are some of the vectors v 6= 0
such that either the left half or the right half is zero but not both. Therefore,
we have LPC
∗
(v) = 0. Since this satisfies E(LPC
∗
(v)) ≤ 1
2`−1 , we still have
E(pSTDC∗ ) ≤ 2−k + 2−k
2k − 1
2` − 1 .
uunionsq
Theorem 19 (Advantage of ML bounded by decorrelation). We have
E(pMLCK )− E(pMLC∗) ≤ n
√
2k−` + 2k−1‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞.
Proof. We first apply Lemma 16. Then, since
√· is concave, the Jensen inequality
says that
E
(√
pSTDEnc − 2−k
)
≤
√
E(pSTDEnc − 2−k).
By using Lemma 17 and Lemma 18, we obtain
E(pMLCK )− E(pMLC∗) ≤ n
√
2k−`
1− 2−k
1− 2−` + 2
k−1‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞.
The bound in Th. 19 is trivial for k > `. For k ≤ `, we bound 1−2−k
1−2−` ≤ 1 and
conclude. uunionsq
4 Truncated Differential Attack
As in [10,11], we restrict to V of form Vin × Vout with Vin and Vout subspaces
of {0, 1}` of dimension s and q, respectively. We have V ⊥ = V ⊥in × V ⊥out. The
dimension of V ⊥ is 2`−k = `−s+`−q. We consider the following distinguisher:
Distinguisher TD:
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: pick (x, x′) ∈ ({0, 1}`)2 uniformly such that x⊕ x′ ∈ V ⊥in
3: set y = Enc(x) and y′ = Enc(x′)
4: set bi = 1((x,y)⊕(x′,y′))∈V ⊥
5: end for
6: output f(b1, . . . , bn)
The function f which computes the output depending on the vector b is left
arbitrary. For instance, with f(b1, . . . , bn) = b1 · · · bn, this captures impossible
differentials [2]. This is a non-adaptive iterated attack of order 2.
Lemma 20 (Link between TD and STD). For any fixed Enc and Enc∗, we
have
|pTDEnc − pTDEnc∗ | ≤ n2s|pSTDEnc − pSTDEnc∗ |.
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Proof. We let p1 denote the best distinguisher with same D and n = 1. We apply
Lemma 13 and we obtain
|pTDEnc − pTDEnc∗ | ≤ n|p1Enc − p1Enc∗ |.
Clearly, depending on the sign of p1Enc− p1Enc∗ , either p1 is the probability that a
differential is found, or it is the probability that it is not found. In any case, we
have 2−s|p1Enc − p1Enc∗ | = |pSTDEnc − pSTDEnc∗ |, and we obtain the result. uunionsq
Theorem 21 (Advantage of TD bounded by decorrelation). For the TD
differential distinguisher described in this section, we have
E(pTDCK )− E(pTDC∗) ≤ n21+s−`
1− 2−k
1− 2−` + n2
s−1‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞.
Proof. Due to Lemma 20, we have
pTDEnc − pTDEnc∗ ≤ n2s|pSTDEnc − 2−k|+ n2s|pSTDEnc∗ − 2−k|
= n2s
(
pSTDEnc − 2−k
)
+ n2s
(
pSTDEnc∗ − 2−k
)
since we know from Th. 1 that pSTDEnc − 2−k is positive. Based on Lemma 17, we
have, E(pSTDCK )− E(pSTDC∗ ) ≤ 12‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞. So,
E(pTDCK )− E(pTDC∗) ≤ 2n2s
(
E(pSTDC∗ )− 2−k
)
+ n2s−1‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞.
Due to Lemma 18, we obtain the result. uunionsq
Remark 22. The critical term for ML in Th. 19 is n22k−1‖[CK ]2− [C∗]2‖∞. The
one for TD in Th. 21 is n2s−1‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞. Presumably, we have lost a
factor n in Th. 19 and the difference between ML and TD should only be k vs.
s, the dimension of V vs. the one of Vin.
Remark 23. For s = `−1 and q = 1, V ⊥in has a single non-zero vector (which can
be seen as a difference vector ∆) and Vout has a single non-zero vector (which
can be seen as a mask Γ ). However, our bound is useless in that case since
21+s−` = 1. Here, we used again the loose bound of Lemma 13, but changing
n into
√
n would not change this fact. Actually, TD becomes equivalent to DL
in this case, and it is known that 4-decorrelation is needed to protect against
DL [1]. Since our TD-security results uses 2-decorrelation, improving this bound
to get a more useful one in the case of DL would require to use 4-decorrelation.
Except for the equivalence to DL, these observations extend to all values of q.
5 Improvement of Previous Results
5.1 Improvement in the Linear and Differential-Linear Contexts
If ‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞ ≈ 2−`, the bound derived in Th. 7, for linear attacks, is
approximately equal to 3(1 + 3
√
2)
3
√
n2−` and is useful only if the attacker can
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take advantage of up to 2`/311 plaintext-ciphertext pairs. For a 64-bit cipher,
it would corresponds to attacks with data complexity less than 255.71. In this
section we provide a new bound, for linear attacks, useful for n up to 2`/24 which
is 259.42.
Th. 7, which is given in Sect. 2.1, has been originally derived in 2003 [21].
The following result consists of an improvement of the upper bound of E(pLCCK )−
E(pLCC∗). This improvement is obtained thanks to the Jensen equality.
Theorem 24 (Advantage of LC bounded by decorrelation, improve-
ment of Th. 7). For the linear distinguisher of Sect. 2.3, we have
E(pLCCK )− E(pLCC∗) ≤ 2
√
n‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞ + n
2` − 1 + 2
√
n
2` − 1 .
Proof. Based on [21, Lemma 15], we know that there is some p0 such that for
every Enc, we have |pEnc − p0| ≤ 2
√
nLPEnc(a, b).
To prove Th. 7, the method used in [21] consisted in getting for any A that3
E(pLCEnc)− p0 ≤ 2 ·A
√
n+ 1A2E(LP
Enc(α, β)) and then in minimizing the sum in
terms of A. In [21], A = n−
1
6
3
√
E(LPEnc(α, β)) was taken, to get E(pLCEnc)− p0 ≤
3 3
√
nE(LPEnc(α, β)).
To derive the improved bound, instead, we use the Jensen inequality to obtain
|E(pEnc)− p0| ≤ 2
√
nE(LPEnc(α, β)).
We consider the elementary non-adaptive distinguisher picking x and x′ and
checking if α · (x⊕ x′) = β · (Enc(x)⊕ Enc(x′)). The probability of the equality
is p2 + (1 − p)2 = 12 (2p − 1)2 + 12 where p = Pr[α · x = β · Enc(x)]. There-
fore, it is 12LP
Enc(α, β) + 12 and LP
Enc(α, β) expresses the advantage of a non-
adaptive distinguisher using two queries. From Th. 2, we have E(LPCK (α, β)) ≤
E(LPC
∗
(α, β)) + ‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞. From [21, Lemma 14] we obtain that
E(LPC
∗
(α, β)) =
1
2` − 1 .
uunionsq
In the same way the bound derived for the differential-linear attack, in Th. 8
is approximately equal to 3( 3
√
3 + 3
√
2)
3
√
n2−` and is useful for an attacker which
can take advantage to up to 2`/532 plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Using the same
technique, meaning the Jensen inequality, we can improve Th. 8 and derive a
new bound in the differential-linear context which is valid for any attack using
up to 2`/39 plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
3 The last term bounds the probability that LPEnc(α, β) exceeds A2 and the first is a
consequence of [21, Lemma 15].
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Theorem 25 (Advantage of DL bounded by decorrelation, improve-
ment of Th. 8). For the differential-linear distinguisher of Sect. 2.3, we have
E(pDLCK )− E(pDLC∗) ≤2
√
n‖[CK ]4 − [C∗]4‖∞ + n 2× 2
` − 5
(2` − 1)(2` − 3)+
2
√
n
2× 2` − 5
(2` − 1)(2` − 3) .
5.2 In the Context of Differential and Boomerang Attacks,
Extension of Th. 6 and Th. 10
Before providing, in this section, an extension of Th. 6 and Th. 10, we present
an extension of [21, Lemma 15] for the following iterative distinguisher:
Distinguisher Dist:
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: pick a bit bi with expected value pEnc
3: end for
4: output f(b1, . . . , bn)
Lemma 26. Let pEnc be a probability depending on a cipher Enc. We have
|E(pDistCK )− E(pDistC∗ )| ≤ n.max(E(pCK ), E(pC∗)).
Proof. If f(0, . . . , 0) = 0, then pDistEnc ≤ npEnc and E(pDistCK )−E(pDistC∗ ) ≤ E(pDistCK ) ≤
nE(pCK ). Similarly, we have E(p
Dist
C∗ )− E(pDistCK ) ≤ E(pDistC∗ ) ≤ nE(pC∗), and the
result holds in this case.
If f(0, . . . , 0) = 1, we change f to 1−f without changing |E(pDistC∗ )−E(pDistCK )|
and go back to the previous case. uunionsq
Differential Distinguisher. In Sect. 2.1, the differential distinguisher is defined for
a given Boolean function f corresponding to f(b1, · · · bn) = maxi bi. In practice,
for many differential attacks more than one valid pair is necessary to distin-
guish the cipher from a random permutation. In this section we generalize this
distinguisher to any Boolean function f .
Theorem 27 (Advantage of DC bounded by decorrelation, improved
Th. 6). For the distinguisher DC, we have
E(pDCCK )− E(pDCC∗) ≤
n
2` − 1 +
n
2
‖[CK ]2 − [C∗]2‖∞.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Th 6 which can be found in [21,
Th. 13]. The difference is that we use Lemma 26 to get rid of the arbitrary f .
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Boomerang Distinguisher. In the same way, we can improve the boomerang
distinguisher by considering any Boolean function f . As for Th. 10, we can
prove the following result.
Theorem 28 (Advantage of Boo bounded by decorrelation, improved
Th. 10). For the distinguisher Boo, we have
E(pBooCK )− E(pBooC∗ ) ≤ n
2× 2` − 5
(2` − 1)(2` − 3) +
n
2
‖[CK ]4 − [C∗]4‖a.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the multidimensional linear and truncated differential
attacks in the context of the decorrelation theory. We showed that these attacks
are non-adaptive iterated attacks of order 2. Table 1 summarizes the considered
attacks. In particular, we obtained three types of results:
– we improved the bounds for the linear and differential-linear distinguishers
(Th. 7 and Th. 8 are improved by Th. 24 and Th. 25, respectively);
– we generalized the differential and boomerang distinguishers to allow an
arbitrary function f (Th. 6 and Th. 10 are improved by Th. 27 and Th. 28,
respectively);
– we proved the security for multidimensional linear and truncated differential
with decorrelation (Th. 19 and Th. 21).
We let as open problems the seek for an improved Lemma 13 with
√
n instead
of n as suggested in Rem. 15. This would allow for better bounds in Th. 19 and
Th. 21. We shall also find better bounds based on a higher order of decorrelation,
in particular to link Th. 21 to Th. 25 (see Rem. 23).
Table 1. The decorrelation order of some statistical attacks.
Attack
Decorrelation Type Attack Maximal
order of attack order n
Linear LC 2 iterative 1 2`
Differential DC 2 iterative 2 2`
Differential-linear DL 4 iterative 2 2`−1
Boomerang Boo 4 adaptive, iterative 4 2`−1
Multidimensional linear ML 2 vector-iterative 1 2
`−k
2
Truncated differential TD 2 iterative 2 2`−s−1
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